We explore the optimal fertility timing in a four-period OLG economy with physical capital, whose speci…city is to include not one, but two reproduction periods. It is shown that, for a given total fertility rate, the economy exhibits quite di¤erent dynamics, depending on the timing of births. If all births take place in the late reproduction period, there exists no stable stationary equilibrium, and the econony exhibits cyclical dynamics due to labour growth ‡uctuations. We characterize the long-run social optimum, and show that optimal consumptions and capital depend on the optimal cohort growth factor, so that there is no one-to-one substitutability between early and late fertility. We also extend Samuelson's Serendipity Theorem to our economy, and study the robustness of our results to: (1) endogenizing fertility timing; (2) assuming rational anticipations about factor prices; (3) adding a third reproduction period.
Introduction
The postponement of births is a key stylized fact of the last four decades. That change in the timing of births can be illustrated by the evolution of the average age of mothers at the …rst birth ( Figure 1 ). 1 In Sweden, for instance, the average age of …rst-time mothers has grown from 25 to 29 years over 1970-2010. The postponement of parenthood is also illustrated by the observed rise in the average age of mothers for all births (Figure 2 ). 2 The observed postponement of births raises several questions. A …rst issue concerns the causes at work behind that phenomenon. In a pioneer article, Gustafsson (2001) reviewed major theoretical and empirical papers aimed at explaining that stylized fact. On the theoretical side, Happel et al. (1984) showed that consumption smoothing may imply delaying births, while Cigno and Ermisch (1989) argued that steeper earnings pro…les induced by education lead to postponing births. 3 On the empirical side, the roles of the better earnings opportunities and better educational achievements for women were emphasized by Ermisch and Ogawa (1994) and Joshi (2002) . 4 Another important issue consists of the evaluation of the e¤ ects of that change in the timing of births on long-run economic dynamics. Momota (2009) examined, in a three-period overlapping generations (OLG) model with …xed total fertility, the impact of changes in the timing of births on the dynamics of the economy. D'Albis et al (2010) studied, in a continuous time OLG model, the joint dynamics of demography and economy under endogenous childbearing ages, while assuming that the total number of children is decreasing in the timing of births. They proved that there exists a monetary steady-state if the average age of consumers is larger than the average age of producers.
A third question raised by the postponement of births consists of its social optimality. Is births delaying desirable from a social perspective? In a twoperiod OLG economy with a unique reproduction period, Samuelson (1975) showed that the (interior) optimal fertility rate balances, at the margin, two e¤ects: on the one hand, the capital dilution e¤ect due to a higher fertility; on the other hand, the intergenerational redistribution e¤ect. 5 Samuelson proved also that fertility allows for the decentralization of the social optimum. This is the Serendipity Theorem: if there exists a unique stable stationary equilibrium, a perfectly competitive economy will converge towards the long-run social optimum when the optimal fertility rate is imposed. 6 Those results presuppose a unique reproduction period, and, hence, say little on the optimal fertility timing.
The goal of this paper is twofold. First, we propose to explore the consequences of fertility timing on long-run economic dynamics. That question can be formulated as follows: for a given total fertility rate (TFR), that is, a given total number of children along the lifecycle, is the timing of births neutral for economic dynamics? Then, in a second stage, we characterize the socially optimal timing of births. Here again, we examine the neutrality of fertility timing: is there, from the point of view of long-run social welfare, a one-to-one substitutability between early children and late children?
In order to answer those questions, we study a four-period perfectly competitive OLG economy with physical capital accumulation. The speci…city of that economy is that there is here not one, but two reproduction periods: the second and third periods of life. To compare the long-run dynamics under di¤erent timing for births, we …rst study, as a baseline, an economy where parents take age-speci…c fertility rates as given, and analyze the impact of distinct fertility pro…les on the long-run dynamics, under myopic anticipations about future factor prices. Then, we characterize the long-run social optimum, and study the optimal fertility timing. Finally, we explore the robustness of our results to the introduction of rational expectations about factor prices and endogenous fertility timing, as well as to the addition of a third reproduction period.
Anticipating on our results, we show that distinct timings for births lead to very di¤erent economic dynamics, even under a given total fertility rate. In particular, when all births take place in the late reproduction period, there exists no stable stationary equilibrium. Then, focusing on the long-run social optimum, we show that optimal consumption paths and optimal capital are de…ned 5 Note that, as shown by Deardor¤ (1976) , an interior optimal fertility rate does not always exist in a two-period OLG economy with Cobb-Douglas production and utility functions. In a more general model with CES production and utility functions, Michel and Pestieau (1993) emphasized that an interior optimal fertility rate requires a su¢ ciently low substitutability between capital and labour in the production process, and between …rst-and second-period consumptions in utility functions. Abio (2003) and Abio et al (2004) complemented those papers by studying optimal fertility under costly, endogenous fertility. 6 Recently, Jaeger and Kuhle (2009) in terms of the optimal long-run cohort growth factor, in which early and late fertility rates are no one-to-one substitutes (unlike in the TFR). We also derive an extended Serendipity Theorem: a perfectly competitive economy converges towards the social optimum, provided the government imposes the optimal longrun cohort growth factor. Finally, those results are shown to be robust to the introduction of rational expectations about factor prices, to the addition of a third reproduction period, as well as to endogenous fertility timing. 7 The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents the baseline model. The long-run dynamics is studied in Section 3. Section 4 characterizes the long-run social optimum and studies its decentralization in line with Samuelson's Serendipity Theorem. Section 5 considers three extensions: (1) rational expectations about factor prices; (2) endogenous fertility; (3) addition of a third reproduction period. Section 6 concludes.
The model
We consider a four-period OLG model with physical capital accumulation. Its speci…city lies in the existence of two -instead of one -reproduction periods. Period 1 consists of childhood. In periods 2 and 3, agents supply their labour inelastically, consume, save and make children. In period 4, they are retired.
Demography
Throughout this paper, we assume initial conditions insuring that the economy exhibits a strictly positive number of births at any period: N 1 > 0, N 0 > 0, where N t denotes the number of individuals born at period t.
Individuals have n children in period 2, and m children in period 3. The total fertility rate (TFR) is, without loss of generality, assumed to be strictly positive, i.e. n + m > 0. The total number of individuals born at time t is:
The cohort size growth factor g t Nt Nt 1 is obtained by dividing (1) by N t 1 :
If all children are born from young parents (i.e. m = 0), the cohort growth factor g t is constant over time, and equal to n. If, on the contrary, all children are born from old adults (i.e. n = 0), g t is no longer constant over time, but, rather, exhibits a two-period cycle. 8 In the general case where n > 0, m > 0, g t 7 Except the Extended Serendipity Theorem. 8 To see this, note that etc::: converges, in the long-run, towards a unique level, equal to: g = n+ 2 p n 2 +4m 2 . To see this, denote g t+1 f (g t ) = n+ m gt . We have that lim gt!0 f (g t ) = +1, and lim gt!+1 f (g t ) = n > 0. In the (g t ; g t+1 ) space, f (g t ) lies above the 45 line for low g t levels, but below the 45 line for high g t levels. Thus, by continuity, f (g t ) must cross the 45 line for some g t , whose value is obtained by setting g t+1 = g t in f (g t ), leading to g = n+ 2 p n 2 +4m 2
. Given that f 0 (g t ) 0, the intersection of f (g t ) with the identity line is unique. Note also that, as jf 0 (g)j = 4m 2n 2 +4m+2n 2 p n 2 +4m < 1 when n > 0, g t converges, for any g 0 > 0, towards n+ 2 p n 2 +4m 2 . This is not the case when n = 0, at which jf 0 (g t )j = 1. Therefore, under a given T F R = n + m, the population dynamics vary depending on the timing of births. Early and late births, although one-toone substitutes in the TFR formula, are no one-to-one substitutes as far as population dynamics is concerned. That point is illustrated on Figure 4 , which shows the dynamics of the number of births under T F R = 1:15, under two fertility pro…les: n = 1:15, m = 0 and n = 0, m = 1:15. The di¤erences between the two patterns are twofold. First, as expected, the cohort size growth is larger when births take place earlier in the lifecycle. Second, whereas N t grows constantly under the fertility pro…le (1:15; 0), it exhibits a cyclical growth under the fertility pro…le (0; 1:15). 9 In order to examine the in ‡uence of birth timing on the economy, let us …rst describe the total labour force. Given that all agents supply their labour inelastically in their second and third periods of life, total labour force at t is:
Dividing (3) by L t 1 = N t 2 + N t 3 yields the labour growth factor:
If n > 0, g t converges, in the long-run, towards n+ 2 p n 2 +4m 2 , which is also the long-run labour growth factor. If n = 0, there is, in general, no convergence. Since g t 2 g t 1 = m, the labour force growth ratio is, in that case:
thus varying over time, except in the special case of replacement fertility, i.e. m = 1, for which the labour supply is constant over time. As shown on Figure 5 , total labour can exhibit, under a given TFR, quite di¤erent patterns, depending on the timing of births. Labour grows at a constant rate when births are located in the early reproduction period, but grows at a ‡uctuating rate when births occur during the late reproduction period.
Production
The production of an output Y t involves capital K t and labour L t , according to the function: 10
where is the depreciation rate of capital. The function F (K t ; L t ) is assumed to be homogeneous of degree one. Hence, the total production function F (K t ; L t ) is also homogeneous of degree one, and the production can be written as:
where y t = Yt L y t = Yt Nt 1 denotes output per young worker, and k t = Kt
Nt 1 denotes the capital per young worker. The resource constraint of the economy, which states that what is produced is either consumed or invested, is:
where c t , d t and b t are …rst-, second-and third-period consumptions. 11 Dividing that constraint by the young labour force L y t = N t 1 , one gets:
Finally, we assume that the economy is perfectly competitive, so that production factors are paid at their marginal productivity:
where w t denotes the wage rate, and R t is the return on savings at period t.
Individual behavior
The problem of individuals can be written as:
1 0 It is assumed that the undepreciated units of capital are sold on the goods market. 1 1 It is assumed that children live with their parents and share their consumption spending.
where the temporal utility function u( ) satis…es u 0 ( ) > 0 and u 00 ( ) 0. The parameter is a time preference factor (0 < < 1).
Resolving that optimization problem allows us to derive savings in the second and third periods, denoted by s t and z t+1 . Under perfect foresight, those optimal savings are functions of current and future factor prices: 12
3 Long-run dynamics
Backwarding the second savings equation by one period gives us z t , i.e. the old worker's savings chosen at t 1. Then, substituting for s t and z t in K t+1 = N t 1 s t + N t 2 z t , and dividing by the number of young workers L y t+1 = N t , yields:
Given that R t = R(k t ) and w t = w(k t ), the dynamics of k t is described by a di¤erence equation of order 3. 13 As stressed by de la Croix and Michel (2002) , the dynamics of capital under perfect foresight is quite complex when savings are made at several periods. There exist only a few ways to overcome that complexity. A …rst approach consists of imposing particular functional forms for utility and production functions. A second approach consists of keeping general functional forms, but of relaxing the perfect foresight assumption. If, for instance, one considers myopic anticipations, the number of time lags in the dynamic law of capital can be reduced. 14 In this section, we consider the myopic anticipations case. Then, in Section 5, we will consider rational expectations, under standard utility and production functions.
Under myopic anticipations on factor prices, the savings s t and z t+1 can be rewritten by means of the following savings functions:
Backwarding the second equation by one period and substituting for s t and z t in the capital accumulation equation yields: k t+1 = (kt) gt + (kt 1) gt 1gt . If one introduces the variable t (kt 1) gt 1 , the dynamics of the economy is summarized 1 2 See de la Croix and Michel (2002, pp. 64-66) . 1 3 The highest-order term k t+2 comes from the interest factor at old adulthood for the young adult at t, i.e. R t+2 , whereas the lowest-order term k t 1 comes from the wage faced by old adults at t when being young workers at t 1, i.e. w t 1 .
1 4 In our context, myopic anticipations mean that agents, when choosing their savings, take the current wages and interest rates as a proxy for future wages and interest rates. by the following three-dimensional dynamic system:
The following proposition summarizes our results.
Proposition 1 Assume myopic anticipations about factor prices. Assume that (0) = 0, 0 (k t ) > 0, (0) = 0 and 0 (k t ) > 0. Suppose n + m > 0. Denote 2 p n 2 + 4m by .
If lim k!0
, there exists a stationary equilibrium with k; ; g > 0.
That stationary equilibrium is locally stable if and only if:
Proof. See the Appendix. The necessary and su¢ cient conditions for stability can be used to examine the impact of the timing of births on economic dynamics. For that purpose, Corollary 1 compares two economies di¤ering on the timing of births.
Corollary 1 Assume myopic anticipations about factor prices.
Assume n > 0 and m = 0. Provided (0) = 0, (0) = 0, lim k!0 n h 1
n , there exists a stationary equilibrium with k; ; g > 0. Provided
n 2 + 1, that equilibrium is locally stable. Assume n = 0 and m > 0. Provided (0) = 0, 0 (k t ) > 0, as well
m , there exists a stationary equilibrium with k; ; g > 0, which is unstable.
Proof. See the Appendix.
Corollary 1 shows that the timing of births plays a crucial role in longrun economic dynamics. Whereas there exists, under mild conditions, a locally stable stationary equilibrium when all births take place early in life (i.e. n > 0 and m = 0), there exists no stable stationary equilibrium when all births are late births (i.e. n = 0 and m > 0).
The underlying intuition lies in the existence, under the latter fertility pro…le, of permanent ‡uctuations in labour growth caused by cycles in the cohort growth g t (see Figure 5 ). Those permanent ‡uctuations in labour growth generate perpetual ‡uctuations in k t , as well as in output and wages, and, hence, prevent the economy from converging towards a stationary equilibrium. As stated in Proposition 2, the economy with only late births is, under mild conditions, characterized by long-run cycles of period 2.
Proposition 2 Assume myopic anticipations about factor prices. Suppose (0) = 0, 0 (k t ) > 0, (0) = 0 and 0 (k t ) > 0.
admits a non-negative solution and denote it by t Ê (k t ).
Assume that the equation
admits a non-negative solution and denote it by t E(k t ).
the long-run dynamics is a two-period cycle (k;^ ; g 0 ); ( k; ; m g0 ).
Convergence to the cycle (k;^ ; g 0 ); ( k; ; m g0 ) arises, i¤ :
In the light of this, the major role played by the timing of births could hardly be overemphasized. Whether births occur in the early or the late reproduction period makes a substantial di¤erence. In the former case, the long-run dynamics is, in general, stationary, whereas, in the latter case, the dynamics is cyclical. Hence, even under an equal T F R = n + m, the two dynamics di¤er strongly, because of the distinct timings of births.
Finally, it is worth emphasizing a special case, where the economy will converge, in the long-run, towards a stationary equilibrium, despite all births being located during the late reproduction period.
Remark 1 Assume myopic anticipations about factor prices. Assume N 1 = N 0 > 0, n = 0 and m = 1.
, there exists a locally stable stationary equilibrium with k; ; g > 0.
Thus, under particular initial conditions (N 1 = N 0 > 0), an economy with replacement fertility converges towards a stationary equilibrium despite all births being located in the second reproduction period. It should be stressed, however, that this convergence is achieved only because the initial level of the cohort growth factor g 0 takes, under those postulated initial conditions, its long-run equilibrium value (equal to unity). Therefore, in that special case, the question of the convergence of the cohort growth factor towards its long-run level is trivially solved. One can thus interpret the result presented in the above remark as a kind of "conditional" convergence result, where the in ‡uence of fertility timing is neutralized by initial conditions. That special case, which involves speci…c initial conditions as well as a TFR equal to the replacement fertility level, does not question the general result obtained in this section (which does not presuppose speci…c initial conditions). The long-run dynamics of the economy -in particular the existence of a stable stationary equilibrium -is in ‡uenced by the timing of births, even for a given TFR. Therefore, if one only looks at the TFR, one misses a central aspect of the evolution of economies over time, since the nature of long-run dynamicsstationary or cyclical -depends on n > 0 or n = 0, whatever the TFR is.
Long-run social optimum
Let us now characterize the long-run social optimum in our economy. For that purpose, we will follow the approach pioneered by Samuelson (1975) , who considers the problem faced by a social planner, who chooses the optimal levels of consumptions, capital and fertility, in such a way as to maximize the lifetime welfare of an agent living at the long-run equilibrium. The major di¤erence with respect to Samuelson is that the social planning problem consists here of choosing not one, but two fertility rates: n and m.
The social planner' s problem
Let us assume that there exists a unique stable stationary equilibrium in our economy. 15 Then, the social planner's problem can be written as follows:
An interior optimum (c ; d ; b ; k ; n ; m ) satis…es the following FOCs:
The …rst expression implies that the MRS between consumptions at two successive periods is, at the optimum, equal to the optimal long-run cohort growth factor, (n + 2 p n 2 + 4m )=2. Thus, from the point of view of the optimal consumption pro…le, it is not the TFR n + m that matters, but the cohort growth factor g , in which early and late births are no one-to-one substitutes.
The second expression is the Golden Rule: the optimal stock of capital per young worker k is such that the marginal productivity of capital is equal to the optimal cohort growth g . Here again, for a given total fertility rate n + m , the optimal capital will vary greatly with the optimal timing of births, since there is no one-to-one substitutability between early births n and late births m.
Regarding the FOCs for optimal n and m , we have:
Those FOCs include the standard determinants of optimal fertility. On the LHS, we have the negative e¤ects of fertility on the marginal productivity of labour (…rst term), as well as the capital widening e¤ect (second term). That latter e¤ect is known as the "Solow e¤ect": a larger growth in the cohort size makes it more di¢ cult to sustain a large capital per young worker level. On the RHS, we …nd the gains from intergenerational redistribution. This is the "Samuelson e¤ect": a larger growth in the cohort size relaxes the resource constraint of the economy, by reducing the weight assigned to the old's consumption.
To interpret those FOCs, note that these can be written as:
where g n = 1 2 + n 2 1 2 p n 2 +4m > 0 and g m = 1 2 p n 2 +4m > 0 denote the derivatives of the optimal cohort growth rate with respect to the optimal age-speci…c fertility rates n and m respectively. Focusing on the case of interior optimal age-speci…c fertility rates, i.e. n > 0, m > 0, it follows that g n and g m di¤er from 0. Therefore, the two above FOCs are satis…ed if and only if:
The optimal cohort growth g is such that the marginal welfare loss from a higher cohort growth (the LHS) is equal to the marginal welfare gain from a higher cohort growth (the RHS). The negative welfare e¤ects due to a higher cohort growth are the capital widening e¤ect (1st term of the LHS) and the negative productivity e¤ect (2nd term of the LHS), whereas the positive welfare e¤ects are the intergenerational redistribution e¤ects (1st and 2nd terms of the RHS). That condition for optimal cohort growth rate can be rewritten as:
In the Appendix, we solve that cubic equation, and derive the optimal cohort growth rate g . That variable determines both the optimal consumption paths and capital level k . Moreover, we know from above that, as long as g takes its optimum level g , the two FOCs characterizing the optimal age-speci…c fertility rates n and m are also satis…ed. Hence the characterization of the social optimum requires, above all, a characterization of the optimal cohort growth rate g , rather than of the age-speci…c fertility rates, which a¤ect optimal consumption paths and capital only through the optimal cohort growth rate.
Proposition 3 Assume that there exists a unique stable stationary equilibrium.
The long-run social optimum (c ; d ; b ; k ; n ; m ) is such that:
The optimal cohort growth g is characterized as follows:
Proof. See the Appendix. The social optimum depends on age-speci…c fertility rates n and m only insofar as these yield the optimal cohort growth rate g . As long as n and m are such that (n + 2 p n 2 + 4m )=2 is equal to g , the levels of n and m do not matter. 16 Hence there is not one, but several social optima (c ; d ; b ; k ; n ; m ), since various pairs (n ; m ) yield the optimal cohort growth g .
Nevertheless, it should be stressed that there exists, from the perspective of long-run social welfare, no one-to-one substitutability between early and late births. 17 Hence, focusing only on the TFR is, here again, misleading. The importance of fertility timing is especially strong when the optimal cohort growth g is large, that is, when the intergenerational redistribution e¤ect is large.
That point is illustrated on Figure 6 , which shows iso-g lines, i.e. the set of (n; m) pairs such that n+ 2 p n 2 +4m 2 = g. An economy whose g is equal to, for instance, 2, and which undergoes a fertility postponement from n = 2 to n = 1, can only sustain g = 2 provided m is raised from 0 to 2, implying a rise in TFR from 2 to 3. Thus the achievement of a high g imposes, in case of birth postponement, a strong rise in the total number of children.
In sum, an exclusive emphasis on the TFR n+m is quite misleading from the point of view of long-run social welfare. There exists, in general, no one-to-one substitutability between early and late births, so that fertility timing matters for long-run social welfare. 
The Serendipity Theorem
In his Serendipity Theorem, Samuelson (1975) showed that, if there exists a unique stable stationary equilibrium in a two-period OLG model with physical capital, then the perfectly competitive economy will converge towards the longrun social optimum provided the optimal fertility rate is imposed on individuals. The purpose of this subsection is to examine whether the Serendipity Theorem remains valid in our environment. The question is the following. Assume that individuals behave like price-takers on competitive markets, and take fertility rates n and m as given. Is the economy going to converge towards the long-run social optimum when the optimal fertility is imposed?
The approach adopted by Samuelson is counterintuitive, since fertility is not, in the real world, taken "as given" by individuals, but is the outcome of parents'decisions. 18 However, we adopt Samuelson's approach, since it allows us to highlight the key role played by fertility -and fertility timing -in an intergenerational context, and, in particular, its capacity to allow for the decentralization of the social optimum in an otherwise decentralized economy.
To evaluate the robustness of Samuelson's result to the modelling of reproduction, let us …rst consider the problem faced by an agent living at the steady-state, who chooses second-and third-period savings, so as to maximize his lifetime welfare, while taking factor prices and fertility rates as given:
Hence, if the planner …xes n and m such that F k (k ; ) = (n + 2 p n 2 + 4m)=2 = g , where k takes its socially optimal level, then individuals, being price-takers, will choose their savings optimally, since the above FOC then coincide with the FOC for optimal intergenerational allocations of resources.
Proposition 4 Assume that there exists a unique stable stationary equilibrium. Then the perfectly competitive economy will converge towards the long-run social optimum provided the optimal cohort growth g is imposed. This amounts to impose fertility rates n and m such that (n + 2 p n 2 + 4m)=2 = g .
Proof. The proof follows from comparing the FOCs of the agent's problem and of the social planner's problem. Proposition 4 shows that Samuelson's Serendipity Theorem is robust to the introduction of di¤erent ages of motherhood. Provided the social planner can impose optimal fertility, all other variables will, in a perfectly competitive economy, take their optimal values at the steady-state.
It is clear that fertility rates can hardly, in the real world, be "imposed" on individuals. That point, which could be formulated against Samuelson's initial framework, remains relevant here. However, in comparison to Samuelson's result, where the decentralization of the long-run social optimum was achieved by imposing the optimal fertility rate n (m being equal to 0), the government has here a larger degree of freedom, since it can play on both n and m. As shown above, the optimal cohort growth g can be achieved through various fertility pro…les (n; m). Hence the government can decentralize the long-run social optimum through various fertility pro…les. The only restriction is that there exists no one-to-one substitutability between early births (n) and late births (m), as shown on Figure 6 . That limitation is especially strong when the optimal cohort growth factor g is large.
Extensions and robustness checks 5.1 Rational expectations
In Section 3, we showed that the long-run dynamics of the economy is, ceteris paribus, signi…cantly a¤ected by the timing of births when agents'anticipations about future production factor prices are myopic. In order to check the robustness of that result to the assumptions made regarding agent's anticipations, we solve here the dynamic system under rational expectations. 19 For that purpose, we impose particular functional forms for preferences and production. Assuming that u(c) = log(c), the problem of the agent is:
From the FOCs, we obtain the savings s t = ( + 2 )Rt+1wt wt+1
. Substituting for s t and z t in the capital accumulation equation yields:
, and denoting (1 )k t 1 by X t , we can, under m > 0, describe the dynamics of the economy by means of the following system: 20
Proposition 5 Assume rational expectations about factor prices. Assume u(c) = log(c) and F (K t ; L t ) = AK t L 1 t , as well as m > 0.
Provided lim k!1
, there exists a stationary equilibrium with k; X; g > 0.
2 0 Under m > 0, we can rewrite g t 1 = m g t n and g t 2 = m g t 1 n , so that: g t 2 = m(g t n)
m ng t +n 2 . Relaxing the assumption m > 0 to m 0 and n + m > 0 would require a dynamic system whose dimension is strictly superior to 4, and, thus, hard to analyze using standard stability conditions on the Jacobian matrix.
.
Proof. See the Appendix. As in the myopic anticipations case, the conditions that are necessary and su¢ cient for the stability of a stationary equilibrium can be used to investigate the sensitivity of economic dynamics to the timing of births.
Corollary 2 Assume rational expectations about factor prices. Assume u(c) = log(c) and F (K t ; L t ) = AK t L 1 t . When n = 0 and m > 0, if
, there exists a stationary equilibrium with k; X; g > 0. That equilibrium is not stable.
In the light of Corollary 2, the robustness of our results to the assumptions made on expectations about factor prices can hardly be overemphasized. The cyclical dynamics prevailing under n = 0 is not due to particular assumptions about expectations, but is really due to the timing of births. Fluctuations in the cohort growth factor g t lead to ‡uctuations in labour growth, and, also, in the capital per head and in the output per head. The sensitivity of economic dynamics to the timing of births is thus a general result, which is robust to assumptions made on anticipations about future factor prices.
Endogenous fertility
Let us now check the robustness of our results to another major assumption: the exogeneity of fertility and fertility timing. To answer that question, this section develops a simple model of lifecycle fertility choices, and examines the associated dynamics of the economy, as well as its long-run social optimum. 21 Various motives were proposed to explain fertility choices, such as dynastic altruism (Barro and Becker 1989) , or children as consumption and/or investment goods (Ehrlich and Lui 1991) . For the sake of simplicity, we assume here that children are pure consumption goods. 22 Each early child has a cost > 0, while each late child has a cost # > 0. 23 Thus the agent's problem becomes:
2 1 For the sake of analytical simplicity, the analysis of dynamics relies here on the case of myopic anticipations about future factor prices.
2 2 On the study of the optimal fertility timing in an OLG model with dynastic altruism à la Barro and Becker, see Pestieau and Ponthiere (2012) . where v( ) is the welfare from having children, with v 0 ( ) > 0, v 00 ( ) < 0. FOCs yield:
The last equation characterizes the trade-o¤ faced by parents between early and late births. Impatience favours early births, while the interest rate favours late births. Moreover, the cost di¤erential between the two types of children also a¤ects the optimal fertility timing chosen by individuals.
Factor prices along the lifecycle (w t , w t+1 , R t+1 , R t+2 ) determine individual savings and fertility choices. As in the baseline model, we solve here the dynamics under myopic anticipations about factor prices. Under that postulate, we can rewrite second-period savings s t and third-period savings z t+1 , as well as early and late fertility rates n t and m t+1 , as functions of k t : s t = (k t ), z t+1 = (k t ), n t = (k t ) and m t+1 = (k t ), where the form of ( ), ( ), ( ) and ( ) depends on the u( ), v( ), , and #.
Long-run dynamics
Substituting for s t and z t in the capital accumulation equation K t+1 = N t 1 s t + N t 2 z t , and substituting for n t and m t in g t+1 = n t + mt gt allows us to describe the dynamics of the economy by means of the following system:
Assuming that:
there exists a stationary equilibrium with k; ; g > 0.
That equilibrium is locally stable if and only if:
Proof. See the Appendix. As in the case with exogenous fertility, the conditions stated here can be used to examine whether the long-run dynamics of the economy is sensitive to the fertility timing. In order to examine how endogenous fertility a¤ects our results, we focus here on the stability conditions when = 0 at the equilibrium.
Corollary 3 Assume that there exists a stationary equilibrium with (k) = 0 and (k) > 0. That equilibrium is locally stable if and only if:
Proof. Those conditions are obtained by …xing (k) = 0 in the stability conditions of Proposition 6. Ceteris paribus, condition (i) is, in comparison to the case where fertility is exogenous (i.e. 0 (k) = 0), now strengthened (resp. weakend) when 0 (k) < 0 (resp. 0 (k) > 0). Regarding condition (ii), the e¤ect of endogenous fertility is ambiguous: whether stability is more likely under endogenous fertility than under exogenous fertility depends on the level of 0 (k) and 0 (k). Finally, from condition (iii), it is straightforward to see that, under exogenous fertility (i.e. 0 (k) = 0 (k) = 0), stability never holds when = 0. However, once fertility is endogenous, stability may prevail, depending on the relative levels of 0 (k) and 0 (k). When parents never have children early in their life (i.e. 0 (k) = 0), condition (iii) can only be satis…ed if 0 (k) (k) g 3 > 0. Thus, when (k) = 0 and 0 (k) = 0, stability requires that late fertility grows when k increases.
In sum, introducing endogenous fertility has ambiguous e¤ects on the necessary and su¢ cient conditions for the stability of a stationary equilibrium. There exists, under particular circumstances, a locally stable stationary equilibrium with all births being located during the second reproduction period. But fertility timing has still a major impact on the stability of the stationary equilibrium.
The long-run social optimum
The problem of the social planner can be written as:
As in the baseline model, the optimal consumption paths and capital are determined by the optimal long-run cohort growth factor g . But a major di¤erence with respect to the baseline model is that the optimal age-speci…c fertility rates are here fully determined, since the FOCs for n and m cannot here be reduced to a condition characterizing g . That di¤erence comes from the fact that parents care here directly about fertility, unlike in the baseline model, where fertility was valued only through consumption possibilities. One corollary of this is that, in this extended model, a government imposing the optimal fertility rates n and m will not make the competitive economy converge towards the long-run social optimum. Hence the Serendipity Theorem no longer holds here.
The optimal fertility pro…le depends on the form of preferences, and on the production process. To illustrate this, let us assume that u(c) = log(c) and v(n) = 'log(n), where ' > 0 captures the parental taste for children, and that the production function is a Cobb-Douglas: Y t = AK t L 1 t . Various calibrations of parameters , A, , ', and # can rationalize the observed fertility pro…le (U.S.), where about 4/5th of births occur in the early reproduction period. Figures 7 and 8 show the long-run lifetime welfare under two distinct calibrations compatible with the observed fertility pro…le. Figure 7 shows that the existing fertility pro…le (in light color) is, from the perspective of lifetime welfare maximization at the long-run equilibrium, dominated by various alternative fertility pro…les. Some dominating pro…les include fewer early children (n < 0:75, same m = 0:25), whereas others include many more early children (i.e. n 1:5), and, above n = 2, more late children (m = 0:5 > 0:25). That result comes from the existence of a local minimum at n = 1. 24 On the contrary, under the alternative parametrization with cheaper late children but larger impatience (Figure 8) , the optimal fertility pro…le takes a quite distinct form: it involves the minimum number of early and late children (n = 0:25; m = 0:25). The reason is that, because of the larger impatience, the intergenerational redistribution e¤ect is dominated by the capital dilution e¤ect, which supports low fertility.
In sum, the optimal fertility pro…le depends strongly on the postulated preferences, since these determine the relative strengths of the capital dilution e¤ect (supporting low fertility) and the intergenerational redistribution e¤ect (supporting high fertility). But in any case, the postponement of births is not welfare-improving. Indeed, if a high cohort size growth is socially bene…cial, it makes sense to concentrate births in the early in life, to obtain a large g. If, on the contrary, cohort growth is a bad thing for long-run welfare, then minimum fertility is the best, and postulating births does not help more. 25
Three reproduction periods
The (im)possibility of asymptotic convergence of the age structure of an economy is signi…cantly sensitive to how reproduction behavior is modelized. In a continuous time model, Lotka (1939) showed that, under a …xed vector of age-speci…c fertility rates and mortality rates, the age-structure of a closed economy 2 4 The existence of an interior fertility rate that minimizes long-run lifetime welfare under logarithmic utility and Cobb-Douglas technology was studied by Deardor¤ (1976) and Michel and Pestieau (1993) in 2-period OLG models. The global optimum is achieved at n = 4:75, m = 0:25.
2 5 Indeed, n = 0 would, by generating cyclical dynamics, lead to signi…cant welfare losses.
will necessary converge towards a constant age structure in the long-run, which is independent from the initial one. In his attempt to derive the equivalent of Lotka Theorem in a discrete time model, MacFarland (1969) assumed that each cohort has descendants in at least two di¤erent cohorts. 26 That condition obviously rules out the case where n = 0 and m > 0.
In the light of this, it makes sense to explore the robustness of our results to the precise modelling of fertility. For that purpose, let us now extend our model to a 5-period OLG model with three reproduction periods (instead of two). 27 Agents have n children in period 2, m children in period 3, and o children in period 4. 28 The total number of births at t is:
Dividing this by N t 1 , we obtain:
De…ning`t +1 o gt allows us to study population dynamics through the system:
Proposition 7 summarizes our results.
Proposition 7 Assume three reproduction periods.
If n > 0, there exists a stable equilibrium g.
If n = 0, m = 0, o > 0, there exists no stable equilibrium g.
If n = 0, m > 0, o = 0, there exists no stable equilibrium g.
If n = 0, m > 0, o > 0, there exists a stable equilibrium g.
Proof. See the Appendix. The timing of births is, here again, not neutral for population dynamics. There exists no stable g under n = 0 when either o = 0 or m = 0. It is only when both m > 0 and o > 0 that asymptotic convergence towards some g is achieved. The existence of two strictly positive age-speci…c fertility rates is thus a necessary condition for the asymptotic convergence of g t when n = 0. Note, however, that the results of Proposition 7 tend to reduce the importance of the …rst period of reproduction: when m > 0 and o > 0, there exists a stable equilibrium cohort growth factor despite n = 0. Hence, within that broader framework, it appears that the number of periods with strictly positive fertility seems to be more important than the timing of fertility.
It should also be noted that, even though the asymptotic convergence of g t is achieved when both m > 0 and o > 0, the duration of the convergence can vary strongly, depending on the particular fertility timing. To illustrate this, Figure 9 compares the dynamics of g t in two cases with at least two strictly positive age-speci…c fertility rates, with, in each case, a TFR equal to 1:05. When the fertility pro…le is smoothed, i.e. n = m = o = 0:35, the convergence towards the equilibrium cohort growth factor is achieved after 16 periods, whereas, under n = 0, m = 1:049 and o = 0:001, the convergence is only achieved after 7,500 periods. 29 Thus the timing of births remains important here, despite the existence of asymptotic age structure convergence.
Because of space constraints, we do not provide here the resolution of the complete eco-demographic model with three reproduction periods. 30 But in the light of what was shown in the two-period case, there is little doubt that cohort growth ‡uctuations imply labour growth ‡uctuations, which prevent the convergence of the economy towards a stationary equilibrium. Hence, the observed sensitivity of economic dynamics to the timing of births for a given TFR is thus robust to the number of reproduction periods.
Conclusions
Birth postponement is a key stylized fact of the last four decades. In this paper, we proposed to examine the consequences of that demographic trend on long-run economics dynamics, as well as the in ‡uence of fertility timing on the long-run social optimum. For that purpose, we developed a 4-period OLG model with physical capital, whose speci…city is to include not one, but two reproduction periods. We …rstly focused on an economy with exogenous age-speci…c fertility rates, and relaxed that assumption later on.
The study of the long-run dynamics in that economy revealed that the timing of births is not neutral at all for economic dynamics. Even for a given total fertility rate, the economy can exhibit quite di¤erent (stationary or cyclical) dynamics, depending on the location of births along the lifecycle. In particular, the economy exhibits long-run ‡uctuations when all births occur the late reproduction period. 31 The reason is that, under that fertility pro…le, labour force growth exhibits perpetual ‡uctuations. The only case where fertility timing does not a¤ect the economy is under replacement fertility.
We also characterized the long-run utilitarian social optimum, and showed that the optimal consumptions and capital are determined by the optimal longrun cohort growth factor, in which there is no one-to-one substitutability between early and late births. We also showed that, when fertility does not directly a¤ect parent's welfare, the only demographic variable characterizing the social optimum is the long-run cohort growth factor, whose level depends on how large the capital dilution e¤ect is in comparison to the intergenerational redistribution e¤ect. We also derived an extended version of Samuelson's Serendipity Theorem. Finally, the sensitivity of economic dynamics to the fertility timing was shown to be robust to the introduction of rational expectations, of endogenous fertility, and to the addition of a third reproduction period.
While those results highlight the importance of birth timing for the understanding of long-run economic dynamics, it should be stressed here that the present framework su¤ers from some simplifying assumptions, which invite further research. In the present model, the labour supply of each agent is inelastic, and does not vary with fertility and fertility timing. But in the real world, the labour supply of agents may be directly related to fertility behavior. In particular, the mere participation to the labour market may vary with fertility (e.g. female labour participation). Another important aspect that was not taken into account here consists of education. Undoubtedly, having children early in life can prevent higher education, with a negative e¤ect on wages during the career. Moreover, our paper did not study the potential interactions between existing pensions systems, wealth accumulation and fertility timing. 32 Those additional links between fertility, fertility timing and the economy would also be worth being studied within a broader theoretical framework.
In sum, although often neglected by economists -who paid more attention to the number of births -, the timing of births is a major determinant of the evolution of economies over long periods of time. Moreover, given that there is, from the perspective of long-run social welfare, no one-to-one substitutability between early and late births, fertility timing also matters from a normative point of view. Focusing on the total number of births -i.e. the TFR -is thus a major simpli…cation, whatever one is concerned with the study of long-run dynamics or with the characterization of the long-run social optimum.
can, at that cohort growth rate, be rewritten as t = n+ 2 p n 2 +4m 2 h k t 2 (kt) n+ 2 p n 2 +4m
i .
The locus can be rewritten as: t = 2 (kt) n+ 2 p n 2 +4m . Note that, as (0) = 0 and (0) = 0, the two loci intersect at k t = 0. Moreover, assuming that
2 0 (kt) n+ 2 p n 2 +4m , it follows that the kk locus lies below the locus for low k t levels, but lies above it for high k t levels. Hence, by continuity, the kk and loci must intersect along the gg locus. That intersection is a stationary equilibrium (k; ; g).
Stability of a stationary equilibrium The Jacobian matrix is: J 0 B @ @G(kt; t;gt) @kt @G(kt; t;gt) @ t @G(kt; t;gt) @gt @H(kt) @kt @H(kt) @ t @H(kt) @gt @I(gt) @kt @I(gt) @ t @I(gt) @gt
C A
Estimating the entries of that matrix at the equilibrium, we obtain that the determinant and the trace are: det(J) = m 0 (k) g 4 0 and tr(J) = 0 (k) g m g 2 ? 0. Following Brooks's (2004) study of stability of …rst-order three-dimensional dynamic systems, we know that all eigenvalues of a 3x3 Jacobian matrix are lower than 1 in modulo (implying stability) if and only if the following three conditions are satis…ed:
where det(J), tr(J) and P M i (J) denote respectively the determinant, the trace and the sum of the principal minors of the Jacobian matrix. Brooks's (2004) conditions (i) is satis…ed if and only if:
Condition (iii) amounts to:
The …rst part of Corollary 1 follows from imposing the restrictions n > 0 and m = 0 in the baseline model. When m = 0, the cohort growth factor is constant and equal to n, and the dynamic system becomes two-dimensional.
Regarding the existence of a stationary equilibrium, the conditions vanish to: lim k!0
n 2 . Those conditions guarantee, by continuity, that the kk locus intersect the locus from below.
Regarding stability, condition (i) is satis…ed when m = 0, since:
Condition (ii) amounts to: 1 > 0 (k) n 2 , which is also satis…ed. Finally, condition (iii) amounts to: h 0 (k)
Regarding the second part of Corollary 1, note …rst that, when n = 0, the gg locus becomes: g t = m gt , so that g = 2 p m. The existence part is thus obtained by …xing n = 0 and g = 2 p m in the existence conditions from Proposition 1. The stability part can be proved as follows. When n = 0, Brooks's condition (iii) is:
The …rst inequality is violated. Therefore there exists no stable stationary equilibrium.
Proof of Proposition 2
Existence of cycles To study the conditions under which a stable cycle arises, let us rewrite the variables as a function of their lagged past values. This gives us the following dynamic system:
Given that g t+2 = g t for all t, it is easy to see that g t ‡uctuates between two levels, given by g 0 = N0 N 1 and m g0 = g 1 . Indeed, g 2 = m g1 = g 0 and g 3 = m g2 = g 1 = m g0 . Hence, the gg locus takes, given g 0 = N0 N 1 , the form of two horizontal planes in the (k t ; t ; g t ) space, at g t = g 0 and g t = m g0 .
The kk locus consists of all combinations (k t ; t ) such that:
The locus consists of all combinations (k t ; t ) such that:
. At a stationary equilibrium, those two loci intersect. Moreover, we know that the equilibrium cohort growth rate is either g t = g 0 or g t = m g0 .
At g t = g 0 , the two loci become: t = g 0 1 m kt
. Let us denote g 0 1 m kt
asD(k t ). Let us assume that a non-negative solution t to the equality t = (
exists for any level of k t . Let us denote that solution by t Ê (k t ). Given that ( ) and ( ) are monotonically increasing, we have thatÊ 0 (k t ) > 0.
We know that, when k t = 0, we haveD(0) = g 0
is the solution to t =
, which is assumed to be strictly positive. Given that (0) = 0 and 0 (k t ) > 0, it follows thatD(0) = g 0 h 1 0 g0 0 i = 0. We thus haveD(0) <Ê(0), that is, the kk locus lies below the locus for low k t . If we now suppose that lim k!1D (k t ) >lim k!1Ê (k t ), it follows that the kk locus lies below the locus for low k t , but above the locus for high k t . Hence, by continuity ofD(k t ) andÊ(k t ), the two loci must intersect at least once along the 1st part of the gg locus, along which g t = g 0 . We can denote that intersection as k ;^ ; g 0 :
g0 , the two loci become:
Let us assume that a non-negative solution t to the equality t = g 0
exists for any level of k t . Let us denote that solution by t E(k t ). Given that ( ) and ( ) are monotonically increasing, we have that E 0 (k t ) > 0.
We know that, when k t = 0, we have D(0) = m g0 1 ((0) g 0 ) 0 and E (0) is the solution to t = g 0
, which is assumed to be strictly positive. Given that (0) = 0 and 0 (k t ) > 0, it follows that D(0) = m g0 1 ((0) g 0 ) 0 = 0.
We thus have D(0) < E(0), that is, the kk locus lies below the locus for low k t . If we now suppose that lim k!1 D(k t ) >lim k!1 E(k t ), it follows that the kk locus lies below the locus for low k t , but above the locus for high k t . Hence, by continuity of D(k t ) and E(k t ), the two loci must intersect at least once along the 1st part of the gg locus, along which g t = m g0 . That intersection can be denoted as k; ; g0 m .
Stability of the cycle Let us now consider whether the two equilibria k ;^ ; g 0 and k; ; g0 m are stable. The Jacobian matrix is:
J 0 B @ @ (kt; t;gt) @kt @ (kt; t;gt) @ t @ (kt; t;gt) @gt @ (kt; t;gt) @kt @ (kt; t;gt) @ t @ (kt; t;gt) @gt @ (gt) @kt @ (gt) @ t @ (gt) @gt
C A
Computing those entries at the equilibrium, we obtain that the determinant of the Jacobian matrix is:
Note that Brooks's (2004) condition (iii) is here:
The …rst inequality is satis…ed, but the second inequality is not. As a consequence of this, the two equilibria k ;^ ; g 0 and k; ; m g0 are not stable. However, remind that the initial cohort growth factors g 0 and g 1 = m g0 coincide with the equilibrium levels of g t . Therefore, the question of convergence of the economy amounts to investigate whether k t and t converge towardsk and^ when g t = g 0 , and whether k t and t converge towards k and when g t = m g0 . The …rst issue can be studied on the basis of the system:
The Jacobian matrix is: J
Estimating the entries at the equilibrium k ;^ ; g 0 , we obtain that the determinant and the trace are: det(J) =
. Hence the condition for stability j 1 j < 1 and j 2 j < 1 are thus:
. Regarding whether k t and t converge towards k and when g t = m g0 , that issue can be discussed on the basis of the system:
A rationale similar to the one developed in the …rst part of this proof can be used to lead to the stability conditions:
Proof of remark 1
When N 1 = N 0 , we have g 0 = 1. Hence the cycle in g t has, as two values, g 0 = 1 and g 1 = m 1 . Thus, if m = 1, we have g 0 = g 1 = 1. As a consequence, the dynamic system becomes two-dimensional:
From the …rst equation, we can de…ne the kk locus. Imposing k t+1 = k t yields: t = k t (k t ). From the second equation, we can de…ne the locus: t = (k t ). Note that, as (0) = 0 and (0) = 0, the two loci intersect at k t = 0. Moreover, assuming that lim k!0 1 0 (k t ) < lim k!0 0 (k t ) and lim k!+1 1 0 (k t ) > lim k!+1 0 (k t ), it follows that the kk locus lies below the locus for low k levels, but lies above it for high k levels. Hence, by continuity, the kk and loci must intersect at some point. Regarding the stability of that equilibrium, the Jacobian matrix is: J @G(kt; t) @kt @G(kt; t) @ t @H(kt) @kt 0 ! When computing the entries of that matrix at the equilibrium, we obtain that the determinant and the trace of the Jacobian matrix are: det(J) = 0 (k) < 0 and tr(J) = 0 (k) > 0. Hence it is straightforward to deduce that the eigenvalues are: 1 = 0 (kt)+ 2 p ( 0 (kt)) 2 +4 0 (kt) 2 > 0 and 2 = 0 (kt) 2 p ( 0 (kt)) 2 +4 0 (kt) 2 < 0. We are thus in a case where > 0, and where the two eigenvalues are of opposite signs.
The condition for j 1 j < 1 is: 2 q ( 0 (k)) 2 + 4 0 (k) < 2 0 (k). The above condition can be rewritten as: 0 (k) < 1 0 (k). We know that, at the stationary equilibrium, the G(k t ; t ) curve intersects the H(k t ) curve from below, which means that: 1 0 (k ) > 0 (k ). Hence the condition for j 1 j < 1 is satis…ed. The condition for j 2 j < 1, this can be rewritten as: 0 (k) < 1 + 0 (k). Given that, at the equilibrium, the G(k t ; t ) curve intersects the H(k t ) curve from below, we have: 1 0 (k ) > 0 (k ). Hence the condition for j 2 j < 1 is also satis…ed at our equilibrium. Note that, while stability is guaranteed, the convergence towards the stationary equilibrium takes a non-monotonic form, due to the opposite signs of the eigenvalues.
Proof of Proposition 3
As shown above, the equation:
characterizes the interior optimal cohort growth rate g. Given that this equation takes the form of a so-called "depressed cubic" equation, we can use the resolution method develop by Cardano (1545) . That method consists in …rst introducing two new variables, whose sum equals g: s + t = g. We substitute for it in the depressed cubic equation, and obtain:
Then, imposing the constraint F L (k; ) d k + 3st = 0, we get:
Thus s 3 and t 3 are the roots of the equation: . Hence it follows that the optimal g is given by:
27k 3 2 If = 0, we need to choose a cubic root for s 3 . As there is no direct way to choose the cubic root of t 3 , we need to use the relation t = . Hence the optimal cohort growth rate g = s + t is:
If < 0, one can obtain the complex cubic roots by multiplying one of the two above cubic roots by 1 2 + i Existence of a stationary equilibrium Fixing g t+1 = g t in the third equation of system B leads to the long-run cohort growth factor g = n+ 2 p n 2 +4m 2 . Fixing k t+1 = k t in the …rst equation of system B allows us to write the kk locus as: X t = k 2 t g t m g t n [(1+ + 2 ) (1+gt)+(1 )] 2 A 2 2 ( m g t n+m )
1 m(g t n) m ng t +n 2 +m(g t n)
(1+gt) m g t n kt(1 )( m g t n+m )[1+ g t n m ]
A m(g t n) m ng t +n 2 +m(g t n)
:
The XX locus is: X t = (1 )k t . Hence the existence of a stationary equilibrium depends on whether the kk locus and XX locus intersect when g t equals its long-run value g = n+ 2 p n 2 +4m 2
. That intersection occurs when, for some k t ,
we have: (1 )k t g 1+g + kt(1 )g[g+g 1]
The LHS and the RHS are thus equal for k t = 0, which is a stationary equilibrium. In order to examine whether there exists another equilibrium, note that, given < 1: lim k!0 (1 ) k 1 t g 1+g + (1 )g[g+g 1] A (1+g) = +1 >lim k!0
(2 )k 1 t g 2 [(1+ + 2 ) (1+g)+(1 )] 2 A 2 2 ( 1+g g ) 1 (1+g) = 0, and that lim k!1 (1 ) k 1 t g 1+g
. Hence, provided: (1 )g[g+g 1]
, there exists a stationary equilibrium with k > 0.
Stability of a stationary equilibrium The Jacobian matrix is:
J 0 B @ @G(kt;Xt;gt) @kt @G(kt;Xt;gt) @Xt @G(kt;Xt;gt) @gt @H(kt) @kt 0 0 0 0 @I(gt) @gt
C A
Estimating the entries at the equilibrium (k; X; g), we obtain that the determinant and the trace are: det(J) = 2 A 2 3 (1 )k 2 2 ( m g n+m ) 1 m(g n) m ng+n 2 +m(g n) (1+g) < 1.
Reminding that, at equilibrium, we have: 1 = 1 m(g t n) m ng t +n 2 +m(g t n)
(1+gt) g t m g t n [(1+ + 2 ) (1+gt)+(1 )]
; it follows that condition (ii) can be written as:
where 2 A 2 (1 ) 2 k 2 2 ( m g n+m ) 1 m(g n) m ng+n 2 +m(g n) (1+g) .
Using the same simpli…cation, condition (iii) can be written as:
9.7 Proof of Corollary 2 Existence of a stationary equilibrium Fixing g t+1 = g t in g t+1 = n+ m gt in system B under n = 0 leads to the long-run cohort growth factor, equal to g = 2 p m. The kk locus can be rewritten as: X t = k 2 t m[(1+ + 2 ) (1+gt)+(1 )] 2 A 2 2 ( m g t +m )
1 m(g t ) m+m(g t ) (1+gt) m g t kt(1 )( m g t +m )[1+ g t m ]
A m(g t ) m+m(g t )
The XX locus is X t = (1 )k t . The existence of a stationary equilibrium depends on whether the kk locus and XX locus intersect when g t equals its long-run value g = 2 p m. That intersection occurs when, for some k t , we have:
The LHS and the RHS are equal for k t = 0. In order to examine whether there exists another stationary equilibrium, note that, given < 1: , there exists a stationary equilibrium with strictly positive k; X; g.
Stability of a stationary equilibrium Brooks's condition (i) is: .
Condition (iii) is, after simpli…cations:
The …rst inequality is not satis…ed. Therefore condition (iii) breaks, and the equilibrium is not stable.
